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 Abstract 
The choice of a decision rule for the Council of the EU constitutes a trade-off in terms of 
decreased sovereignty for individual governments versus an increased ‘capacity to act’. The 
provisions of the draft constitutional treaty would considerably increase constitutional 
flexibility regarding day-to-day decision-making in the EU, but without adequately protecting 
the interests of the citizens of smaller and medium-sized member states. By comparison, 
provisions foreseen in the Treaty of Nice, which essentially amount to the implementation of 
a ‘triple-majority rule’ in Council decision-making, would lower the Council's capacity to act, 
but would lead to a more moderate ‘re-balancing’ in favor of larger EU states. Finally, the 
paper provides background calculations indicating that, with twenty-five member states, the 
EU risks being unable to reach intergovernmental agreement and hence, a challenging issue 
for the EU is to move towards provisions allowing for its own constitution, once adopted, to 
be amended. 
Zusammenfassung 
Bei der Festlegung von Abstimmungsregeln im Rat der Europäischen Union muss zwischen 
Souveränitätseinbußen einzelner Regierungen und einer erhöhten kollektiven ‚Handlungs-
fähigkeit’ abgewogen werden. Die Regelungen, die im Entwurf zum Europäischen 
Verfassungsvertrag vorgesehen sind, würden die grundlegende Flexibilität im politischen 
Alltag der EU wesentlich erhöhen, ohne jedoch die Interessen der Bürger von kleineren und 
mittleren Mitgliedstaaten angemessen zu schützen. Im Vergleich dazu würden die 
Regelungen, die im Vertrag von Nizza vorgesehen sind und im wesentlichen auf ein 
‚Dreifach-Mehrheits-Prinzip’ b ei Ratsentscheidungen hinauslaufen, die Handlungsfähigkeit 
des Rates mindern, aber zu einer gemäßigteren ‚Gewichtung’ zu Gunsten der großen EU-
Staaten führen. Am Ende legt der Artikel Hintergrundberechnungen vor, die darlegen, dass in 
einer EU mit 25 Mitgliedstaaten die Gefahr besteht, keine intergouvernementale Einigungen 
mehr erzielen zu können. Es wird daher eine Herausforderung für die EU sein, Regelungen 
in die Verfassung einzubauen, die eine Ergänzung dieser ermöglichen. 
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Schlagwörter 
Europäische Verfassung, Abstimmungsregeln, Europäischer Rat, Vertrag von Nizza, qualifizierte 
Mehrheitsentscheidungen  
General note on content 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the IHS 
Department of Political Science 
 
Notes 
This piece has profited from helpful comments of participants at the seminar “The Flexibility of Constitutional 
Design”, organized by the Political Science Department of the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, on 12 
December 2003. Special thanks for information and challenging thoughts on the topic of this piece are due to Iain 
Paterson. For additional comments, I am grateful to Pieter Bakker. Capable research assistance, including the 
collection of information regarding negotiations on voting weights in the Council, was provided by Geertjan 
Wenneker, Leiden University. Contents 
1.  Introduction  1 
2.  The Flexibility of Constitutional Design  5 
3.  Voting Weights, Winning Coalitions and ‘Efficiency’  
in Council Decision-Making  9 
4.  The Nice and Convention Proposals: A Comparison  
with EU Council Decision-Making in the  
Past and Present  12 
5.  Conclusions  19 
References  21 
 I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 1 
1. Introduction 
In June 2003, the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ came to a close. The challenge of 
institutional reform had been significant for several years, and progress, generally, was by 
incremental steps. ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ had partially turned into ‘Nice leftovers’, as the 
December 2000 Nice Summit meeting far from resolved all of the outstanding  institutional 
challenges facing the EU. The Convention dealt with a vast range of issues in a novel 
fashion, involving a variety of societal actors. Institutional reform was just one element of the 
broad range of discussions that took place in the Convention, although a rather central one.
1  
Some crucial institutional issues, even after the conclusion of the Convention, remain 
unresolved. One of the most important stumbling blocks for the potential acceptance of the 
draft constitutional treaty in mid-December 2003 turned out to be the central issue of the 
allocation of voting weights in the Council of the EU. As the Economist claimed, even before 
the failure of the December EU summit meeting, “The single most controversial issue 
concerns the balance of power between EU countries in the Council of Ministers”.
2  
At the earlier 2000 Nice summit meeting, a re-weighting of votes in the Council of the EU 
(sometimes still called the ‘Council of Ministers’) had been decided after lengthy negotiations 
on the issue. Cleavages were then especially evident between larger and smaller EU states 
about appropriate voting weights in the EU Council. Insiders have provided descriptions of 
the tedious bargaining processes that led to the outcomes of the Nice negotiations (e.g. 
Galloway, 2001; Moberg, 2002). The results in terms of vote allocations appeared to be 
determined by ‘power politics’ rather than any careful background reflection, however. 
In view of the central importance of voting weights in the Council of the EU, this paper mainly 
deals with voting weights and modes of majority voting in view of forthcoming EU 
enlargement. The Nice re-weighting of votes had largely been triggered by a dissatisfaction 
among large EU states with what they perceived to be a considerable overweighing of the 
influence of small and medium-sized countries in EU decision-making (e.g. Moberg, 2002). 
The provisions agreed upon at Nice also foresaw a moderate increase in the voting 
threshold applicable in the framework of qualified majority votes (QMV), thereby enhancing 
the capacity of EU states to block decisions (e.g. Felsenthal and Machover, 2001; Leech, 
2002). In percentage terms, the required share of votes needed for proposals to be accepted 
was increased from the present level of just over 71 percent to approximately 74 percent of 
the total, in a projection of enlargement to 27 member states. An important rationale for EU 
states in the respective intergovernmental negotiations had been the maintenance of their 
                                                 
1   For an elaborate overview of the institutional aspects dealt with by the Convention, see Dinan (2003). 
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own capacity to veto, or at least their ability to block decisions together with like-minded 
states. The collective effect of such an adapted decision quota, however, would have been a 
decrease in the Council’s overall capacity to act (e.g. Paterson and Silárszky, 1999; 
Felsenthal and Machover, 2001; Leech, 2002; Hosli and Machover, 2004).
3 The lengthy 
nature of the bargaining process that characterized the Nice negotiations, as well as similar 
discussions in the framework of the Convention, reinforce conjectures that reaching 
intergovernmental agreement within the EU may, in the future, be a rather tedious endeavor 
indeed. Unanimous decision-making, as this paper demonstrates, is rendered significantly 
more difficult when membership is significantly expanded. Evidently, the calculations 
provided in this paper provide simple ‘averages’ that ignore other specific conditions – such 
as effects of collective ‘learning’ and the related possibility of governmental preference 
convergence (e.g. Golub, 1999; 2002). Such developments might facilitate  rather than 
complicate collective decision-making in the EU, even with an expanded membership. This 
paper claims, however, that enlargement by ten new members in spring 2004 will make any 
kind of unanimous intergovernmental agreement rather difficult to reach and hence prolong 
respective negotiations, whether on day-to-day issues regarding taxation, for example, or in 
the ‘broader’ and more general context of treaty reform (what might in the medium-term be 
interpreted as ‘constitutional amendment’). The paper contends that a ‘status quo bias’ is 
likely to result in all areas formally requiring unanimous decisions in the Council of the EU. In 
a normative sense, given the significance of the enlargement, it might indeed be important – 
despite critiques raised against this suggestion by several member state governments – not 
only to replace the unanimity requirement with QMV for various issues areas, but also to find 
ways to adapt the constitution itself on the basis of a decision threshold lower than 
unanimity. If not, it is likely that the new constitution will develop into a static construct, 
unable to respond to new demands and challenges over time. Evidently, any basic polity-
building process involves decisions on how future reform of a constitution should b e 
undertaken as well as agreement on the original make-up of the constitution.  
In terms of ‘day-to-day’ decision-making, the suggestion inserted into the draft constitution to 
allow for a ‘double-majority’ system in which proposals in the Council can pass when they 
are supported by a majority of EU states, representing three-fifths of the EU’s population, is 
rather surprising. Clearly, abolishing voting weights, in a radical departure from the voting 
system applied since the late 1950s, would not only considerably increase the relative 
influence of larger EU states,
4 but would also strongly enhance the capacity of the Council to 
act.
5 Intergovernmental acceptance of such a system would undoubtedly be astonishing 
since such a change would largely abolish EU states’ potential to block decisions, an aspect 
that is, as some have pointed out (e.g. Johnston, 1995; Moberg, 2002), salient to individual 
                                                 
3   Interestingly, applying spatial representations of decision-making in the EU Council, Tsebelis and Yataganas 
(2002) come to the same conclusions. 
4   E.g. see Felderer, Paterson and Silárszky (2003); Felsenthal and Machover (2003). 
5   E.g. Felsenthal and Machover (2003). I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 3 
governments. Could governments of EU member states ever have accepted such a drastic 
change? Apparently, the adapted system was not necessarily based on broad support: it was 
“proposed by the Convention on the Future of Europe in June, which claimed to be an open 
and democratic exercise. But the new voting system was decided upon at the last minute by 
the convention’s  presidium (steering committee) [...]”.
6 Whereas this comparatively 
straightforward decision rule – in contrast to the complex construct agreed upon at Nice – 
might be desirable in terms of transparency and an increased capacity of the Council to act, 
it was likely to be a political non-starter; it is hardly imaginable that governments would be 
willing to accept such a sharp decrease in their capacity to prevent EU decisions from being 
adopted. However, since the effects of the proposed ‘double-majority’ system were not easily 
discernible, it can also be interpreted as being somewhat ‘opaque’.
7 
Evidently, any institutional design is faced with conflicting requirements. Generally, 
institutions need to offer an adequate reflection of citizens’ interests in order to be perceived 
as ‘legitimate’ constructs. However, they also need to be ‘efficient’ in the sense of enabling 
majorities to reach decisions. Finally, institutions need to protect the interests of minorities – 
whether these are cultural, geographic or linguistic, for example. Clearly, all of these 
requirements are crucial for the future of the EU. However, they are partially conflicting: 
enhancing the degree to which minority interests are protected in EU decision-making, for 
example, is likely to decrease ‘efficiency’ (in the sense of enabling majorities to reach 
decisions). In addition, maintaining current veto rights in areas such as taxation, a position 
strongly defended by the UK government, will evidently, after enlargement, slow down the 
EU’s capacity to act in this domain. A similar logic undoubtedly applies to decision-making in 
the challenging and developing field of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). 
This article focuses on the Council of the EU and examines the effects of the current voting 
system, the provisions agreed upon at the Nice summit meeting and those of the ‘double-
majority clause’ contained in the draft constitution on decision-making in the EU. The paper 
contends that the combined effect of unanimity and enlargement has been, and will be in the 
future, to decrease the ‘efficiency’ of decision-making in the Council, in the sense of lowering 
the a priori chances of legislative proposals to be adopted within this institution. This implies 
that the interests, and relative sovereignty, of individual member states are protected, but 
also that previous enlargements are likely to have counterbalanced decisional ‘efficiency 
gains’ generated by the extension of QMV to policy areas previously subjected to the 
unanimity rule. Ceteris paribus, the effect of this will be that, in future, it will be more difficult 
than it is now to change the status quo even in ‘day-to-day’ EU decision-making, due to the 
                                                 
6   The Economist, November 29, 2003, p. 34. 
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lower probability that decisions will be supported by a required Council majority.
8 Given the 
importance of the voting threshold (e.g. Leech, 2002), it seems that discussions at the Nice 
summit meeting have somewhat overemphasized the issue of vote re-weighting. Little 
attention has been paid to the crucial issue of the actual level of the QMV threshold. In 
addition, the Nice summit did not generate clear allocation rules for actual vote distributions. 
Rather, the allocation of voting weights in the Council and the projected distribution of seats 
in the European Parliament appear to be  the product of  ad hoc political bargaining (e.g. 
Taagepera and Hosli, 2003).  
In this paper, the ‘flexibility of constitutional design’ refers to both the capacity of the EU 
Council to act and the capacity of the EU to adapt its constitutional provisions in the future. In 
this sense, an examination of the effecths of the institutional provisions, in combination with 
enlargement, on both ‘rules on decisions’ and ‘rules on rules’ is offered below. 
Methodologically, the article departs from the assumption that future distributions of member 
state preferences in the EU are not known with any degree of accuracy today, as these 
distributions tend to vary according to the policy domain concerned as well as over time. 
Hence, the paper employs a simple ‘baseline’ model in order to assess the EU Council’s 
capacity to act and the capacity of the EU to reform itself in the future. 
By presenting these calculations, the paper emphasizes that the ability of the Council to act 
is not solely determined on the basis of whether decisions are made according to the 
unanimity or QMV rule, but that this institution
9 is also affected by other important factors: 
notably voting weights, the level of the QMV threshold and the number of EU states.
10 In 
order to present and discuss these r espective effects, the paper is structured as follows: 
section two focuses on the challenges of constitutional design, highlighting trade-offs 
regarding decision-making efficiency, flexibility and protection of minority rights, since they 
are certainly important to the EU’s current plans for institutional change; section three 
describes ways to measure decision-making ‘efficiency’ by employing the concept of 
‘decision probability’; section four illustrates how different options regarding decision 
thresholds affect the Council’s overall ‘capacity to act’ and demonstrates these effects in 
terms of decision probability and the relative distribution of influence among EU states 
resulting from both the Nice and Convention proposals; section five summarizes the main 
findings of this paper and concludes. 
                                                 
8   Of course, depending on the constellation of preferences of EU member states in the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, for example, it may still be true that some issues are accepted 
rather swiftly, also in the framework of an EU of 25 members. On average, however, this paper claims that it 
will be more difficult to reach the required threshold after enlargement. 
9   Although the term ‘Council’ is used here, the same logic, of course, applies to deliberations within the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) or working groups linked to the Council, for example. 
10   These aspects are also emphasized by Leech (2002). I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 5 
2. The Flexibility of Constitutional Design 
Changing the EU’s ‘rules’, through processes of treaty reform, currently still requires 
agreement among all EU governments, and subsequent domestic ratification. Clearly, the 
Convention constituted a novel way of adapting the EU’s rules, but governments in the 
subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) were still able to ‘open up’ the entire 
negotiation package and approve, or avoid, insertion even of specific elements into the draft 
constitutional treaty. Hence, ‘constitutional rules’ presently need to be agreed upon 
unanimously. Evidently, this will be increasingly difficult in the future in view of the substantial 
expansion of EU membership. In this sense, ‘rules on rules’ for the EU will be difficult to 
adapt if respective provisions are not changed  – including decisions on the choice of EU 
decision rules themselves. 
As outlined above, ideally, constitutions are designed to meet various, partially contradicting, 
requirements. Most importantly, they need, on the one hand, to represent the interests of a 
majority of the constituents and, on the other hand, to protect the wishes of minorities (such 
as different language, cultural or religious groups), while still remaining flexible in terms of 
their capacity to make decisions, reform themselves, and adapt to new circumstances and 
challenges.  
In federal as well as ‘quasi-federal’ political systems,
11 such trade-offs among different 
objectives tend to be both crucial and politically salient, since the overall constitutional 
design needs to protect the interests of individual system components in order to provide 
them with incentives to remain within the structure. As is well known, the United States, 
based on a federal setup,  has its member states represented on an equal basis in the 
Senate, the parliament’s ‘upper house’, in spite of the fact that their population sizes vary 
considerably. Accordingly, representation in the Senate is on the basis of territory rather than 
population. By comparison, in the U.S. Congress, states are represented according to 
population, with smaller states being represented more favorably.
12 Other federal systems 
are based on similar patterns of representation. This is true for Australia, Canada, Germany 
and Switzerland. A challenge for such systems is to protect the rights of their constituent 
units – states, provinces, cantons, or Länder – while still allowing for sufficient efficiency in 
federal decision-making. Moreover, the inclusion of provisions for constitutional amendment 
and reform presents a particular conundrum for these systems. 
Challenges to the federal system’s ‘capacity to act’ are extensive, for example, in the case of 
Switzerland, a small advanced industrialized democracy encompassing several language 
groups. Swiss double-majority referenda – such as those required for decisions on potential 
                                                 
11   In a not overly bold assessment, we might classify the current EU into the latter category. 
12   For an early analysis of this issue, see Robert Dahl (1956). 6 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
membership of supranational organizations, including the EU, and for constitutional 
amendment more generally  – protect the rights of the Swiss cantons  to a considerable 
extent: in order to pass, referenda need to be supported by a majority of votes cast by Swiss 
voters and a majority of votes in a majority of the 23 cantons. This institutional hurdle is 
rather difficult to take, as the large share of non-accepted proposals illustrates.
13  
Canada’s Constitution Act, proclaimed on 17 April 1982, provided a formula regarding 
procedures for its own amendment. The compromise reached among the Canadian 
provinces is contained in section 38 of the Act, stating that amendments require “[...] 
resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in 
the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty percent of the 
population of all the provinces” (38(1)(b)).
14 The effects of this provision in terms of the 
balance of influence among Canadian provinces, and the inherent flexibility of the system, 
have been analyzed extensively by D. Marc Kilgour and Terrence Levesque (1984). Despite 
the current widespread opposition of member state governments to this suggestion, it seems 
highly likely that, in view of its future size, the EU will need a similar provision regarding 
amendments of its own constitution if it is to avoid gridlock. 
In James Buchanan and Gordon  Tullock’s seminal work, The Calculus of Consent (1962), 
decision-making costs, generally, are assumed to increase with the number of players 
involved. According to the authors, a reduction in the relevant requirement for making 
decisions – a decrease in the ‘decision threshold’ – enhances the capacity of an institution to 
act. This approach resembles Coleman’s analysis of the ‘power of a collectivity to act’ 
(Coleman 1971), to be discussed and applied in more detail below. Unanimity rules ensure 
that all voters endorse a specific issue and no one gets outvoted,
15 as Buchanan and Tullock 
emphasize, but they imply relatively high costs regarding the process of reaching agreement 
(e.g. negotiation and transaction costs). From the perspective of individual voters, in the 
framework of majority votes, the risk of being adversely affected by a collective decision 
contradicting one’s own preferences is most extensive under the simple majority rule (i.e. 50 
percent of the total plus 1 vote). The higher the decision threshold, the better is the 
protection of individual interests, but the lower is the capacity of the collectivity to act. 
                                                 
13   For an analysis of the ‘stability’ of Swiss politics more generally, using spatial models of decision-making, see 
Moser (1995). 
14   Evidently, this formula resembles the ‘double-majority’ clause envisaged by the EU d raft constitution as 
regards ‘day-to-day’ decision-making, but with reversed decision thresholds regarding population and number 
of provinces. 
15   However, members may receive ‘side-payments’ in order to induce them to support a proposal. Moreover, 
they may ‘log-roll’, i.e. trade their votes, obtaining support on an issue crucial to them in exchange for a vote 
on an issue they consider to be of lesser importance. On effects of log-rolling more generally, e.g. see Tullock 
(1976). I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 7 
In federal systems, the attribution of a relatively favorable pattern of representation to smaller 
units may generally increase the sense of the ‘legitimacy’ the system generates amongst its 
citizens (as long as it is not perceived by citizens of larger states as tilting the balance of 
influence towards smaller entities). In such systems, smaller groups  – characterized by 
specific cultural or linguistic ties for example – are able to block decisions they consider to be 
detrimental to their own interests. Accordingly, such groups may choose the option of ‘voice’ 
rather than ‘exit’
16 within the federal structure. However, it seems likely that the protection of 
the interests of individual components in a system has an optimum beyond which the 
flexibility of the system decreases, leading ultimately to a situation in which the system is no 
longer capable of generating decisions (or of reforming itself).
17 
Similarly, in the EU, smaller states may need to have a certain minimum clout in the 
decision-making process in order to enable their citizens to feel content with the overall 
system. The risk of feeling dominated by larger states is ever present in smaller EU states 
and appears to constitute a realistic threat to the perceived legitimacy of the EU’s 
institutional setup. Indeed, negotiations leading to the Treaty of Nice illustrated the extent to 
which smaller and medium-sized EU states were willing to defend their voting weights, 
fearing ‘marginalization’ in the EU’s decision-making process, and voicing concern about 
possible increases in the relative power of the largest states (e.g. Moberg, 2002). Larger EU 
states, in turn, felt there was an increasing domination of the large by the small, presenting 
this finding as a rationale for why their citizens considered the extant system to be lacking 
‘legitimacy’. It is, in fact, this discussion that spurred the debate on the need to re-weight 
votes in the Council.
18  
A considerable range of recent studies has assessed the relative ‘swiftness’ of EU decision-
making, employing various methodological tools, and providing some empirical evidence. 
For example, Golub (1999; 2002) finds, analyzing EU directives, t hat the introduction of 
QMV, combined with enlargement, has not caused a slow-down in EU decision-making over 
time. But could the effects be more pronounced when more members join? König and 
Bräuninger (2002), in their analysis of regulations in addition to directives, contend that, in 
cases in which QMV applies, the relative swiftness of decision-making does indeed slow 
down with enlargement. A similar finding is provided in Schulz and König (2000).  
In terms of increased ‘legitimacy’ and ‘democratic accountability’, most studies agree that the 
enhanced role of the EP in EU decision-making procedures is likely to have increased 
democratic ‘legitimacy’. But, evidently, it may also have slowed down the swiftness of EU 
                                                 
16   For a succinct distinction between ‘voice’ and ‘exit’, and on the importance of the concept of loyalty, see 
Hirschman (1970). 
17   For an analysis of the trade-off between different principles of representation in the EU, and consequences in 
terms of the balance of influence among actors, see Laruelle and Widgrén (1998).  
18   See Best (2000). 8 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
decision-making. This is a significant trade-off, highlighted, for example, in Golub (1999), 
Schulz and König (2000) and König and Bräuninger (2002). If the capacity of the EU to act is 
to remain constant over time, increasing powers for the EP  – desirable in terms of 
strengthening the EU’s democratic foundations  – may need to be counterbalanced by 
decreasing decision-making costs in the Council (i.e. by lowering the threshold in Council 
decision-making rather than increasing it). In this sense, the suggestion contained in the 
draft constitution could provide a helpful remedy to past trends. 
 Similarly, in some work applying the spatial theory of voting to the analysis of EU decision-
making, the decision quota is found to be of crucial importance. For example, Christophe 
Crombez (1996) highlighted  various institutional provisions leading to relative ‘indecision’ in 
EU decision-making and maintaining a ‘status quo bias’. The author suggested adopting the 
simple majority rule in Council decision-making, in order to alleviate the inherent inflexibility 
of the EU’s decision procedures. Similarly, using other analytical techniques, Lane and 
Maeland (1995) and Peters (1996) have advocated the introduction of a simple majority rule 
for EU Council decision-making. 
A somewhat more radical option would be the introduction of a ‘one state, one vote’ rule – 
without a second quotum regarding population size – in the Council, similar to the model of 
the U.S. Senate. Whereas such a provision would certainly enhance decision efficiency in 
the EU, it appears to be impossible to implement politically (e.g. see Baldwin et al., 2001). 
The recent Convention suggestion, however, amounts to almost such a simple majority 
clause, by abolishing the voting weights of individual EU states and allocating one vote to 
each state (while providing for a second quotum, the 60 percent of population provision). 
However, a simple majority rule would significantly reduce the ‘blocking capacity’ of EU 
governments in the Council. Similarly, if not paralleled by a second population quotum, it 
would lower the influence of larger states in EU decision-making. If, against what appears to 
be politically feasible at present, the option of simple majority votes becomes, in the long run, 
a politically acceptable solution, the power of member states to block collective decisions, 
and hence the protection of their sovereignty, would also decrease. 
How can the likelihood that decisions are taken in the Council be assessed in a way that 
provides a ‘baseline’ scenario? One possibility might be to use spatial models of decision-
making (as was presented by Steunenberg et al., 1999) in an assessment of the probability 
that, with different preference constellations, a required majority can be reached in the 
Council. However, another possibility consists of using the decision threshold in order to 
assess the likelihood that winning coalitions form ceteris paribus, ignoring other possible 
influences. 
 I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 9 
3. Voting Weights, Winning Coalitions and ‘Efficiency’ 
in Council Decision-Making  
How will ‘efficiency’ of decision-making be measured in this article? The main focus of the 
analysis is on the probability that, within a committee, winning coalitions can be formed. 
Accordingly, the following sections analyze ‘efficiency’ by calculating the probability that a 
randomly selected coalition among EU member states can meet the required decision quota 
(here the majority requirement in the Council’s voting procedures). The approach essentially 
provides figures on the proportion of winning coalitions in all possible coalitions among EU 
member states, using Coleman’s measure of the ‘power of a collectivity to act’ (Coleman, 
1971). For similar approaches, see Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Kilgour and Levesque 
(1984), Peters (1996), König and Bräuninger (1998; 2002), Baldwin et al. ( 2000; 2001), 
Paterson and Silàrszky (2003), Felsenthal and Machover (2001; 2003) or Hosli and van 
Deemen (2002). The measure provided in this article thus largely neglects political variables 
and the resulting estimates on the likelihood that specific coalitions form among members on 
the basis of particular preference configurations.
19 The approach aims to provide measures 
of ‘constitutional flexibility’, valid over longer time spans and for a broad variety of issue 
areas.  
The technique focuses on the concept of ‘winning coalitions’. Formally, the existence of a 
winning coalition can best be conceptualized in the framework of the theory of simple 
games.
20 A simple game is an ordered pair of sets G=(N,W), where N denotes the full player 
set and W is a set of coalitions (or subsets of N). An element of W is termed a winning 
coalition (correspondingly, the set of losing coalitions is generally denoted by L).
21  
A weighted threshold game is a simple game in which a voting weight is assigned to each 
player. In such  a game, a coalition is winning when the sum of the voting weights of the 
coalition members is larger than, or equal to, the decision threshold (the ‘quota’ of the game).  
                                                 
19  In this sense, the calculations provide ‘baseline’ estimates – almost to be compared to a regression line in 
regression analysis; see Leech (2002). 
20  On the following, e.g. see van Deemen (1997). 
21  The following axioms apply with respect to winning coalitions: (1) any coalition which contains a winning sub-
coalition is itself winning; formally, if S ˛ W and S ˝ T, then T ˛ W (monotonicity requirement); (2) there are 
winning coalitions: W „ ˘; (3) the empty coalition is not winning (˘ „ W). Axioms (2) and (3) ensure that trivial 
games are excluded (see van Deemen, 1997). On legislatures and simple games also see Rapoport (1970: 
207–21). 10 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
A weighted threshold game G is represented by G = [q; w1, w2, ..., wn], with q denoting the 
decision quota and w i player i’s voting weight. Formally, in a weighted threshold game, a 
winning coalition satisfies the condition 
S Wif and onlyif w q i
i S
˛ ‡
˛ ￿ ( ) 1  
 
In words, coalition S is winning if and only if the sum of the weights of the players in the 
respective coalition equals or exceeds the decision threshold. 
In a committee of size n, the total number of possible coalitions (combinations) among 
members, including the ‘grand coalition’ and the empty coalition, is 2
n. Subsequently, the 
number of winning coalitions – for the EU Council in our case – will be denoted by |W|. When 
no restrictions on coalition-formation are introduced, the measure for relative ‘efficiency’, l, 
can simply be calculated with Coleman’s index of the power of a collectivity to act (Coleman 
1971):
22 
n
W =(2).
2
l  
 
Some easy examples can illustrate how values for l are generated. In the voting game G = 
[4; 1, 2, 3], for example, the total number of coalitions is 2
3 = 8. The following non-empty 
coalitions can be formed  among actors: [1], [2], [3], [1, 2], [1, 3], [2, 3], [1, 2, 3]. However, 
clearly only 3 out of these coalitions are winning: [1, 3], [2, 3] and [1, 2, 3], since the sum of 
the voting weights of their elements exceeds, or is equal to, four. Therefore, the figure on 
relative ‘efficiency’ for this example is three-eighths (37.5 percent). If the quota were to be 
increased to 5, the decision probability would decrease to one-quarter (25 percent).  
The analysis needs to be adapted, however, when a double-majority clause applies. 
Formally, as an extension of equation (1), the double-majority requirement is given by   
 
12 (3). ii
iSiS
SWiffwqpq
˛˛
˛‡￿‡ ￿￿  
 
Applied to the EU, q1 may denote the voting weight threshold, wi the voting weight of Council 
member i,
23 p i member i’s share in the EU population total, and q 2 the second decision 
                                                 
22  In the computer program provided by Bräuninger and König (2001), this index is aptly referred to as ‘decision 
probability’. 
23   Note, however, that according to the draft constitutional treaty, votes of EU states would be non-weighted. I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 11 
quotum (the threshold in terms of the required share in total EU population). Winning 
coalitions in the Council under the double-majority clause, according to equation (3), require 
that both decision quotas be met simultaneously. 
In order to further clarify effects, assume that a double-majority rule holds in a committee in 
which the ‘one member, one vote’ rule applies and in addition, that proposals can be 
accepted when they are supported by a predetermined majority of the population as 
represented by the committee members. Let player A’s population be 20 percent of the total, 
B’s 30 percent and C’s 50 percent, and the required (second) decision threshold (q2) 60 
percent of the population total. While the example simplifies the decision-making process in 
terms of the number of committee members, it clearly simulates the ‘double-majority’ clause 
foreseen in the EU draft constitutional treaty.  
The following winning coalitions among committee members simultaneously meet both 
decision thresholds: {A,C}, {B,C}, and {A,B,C}. These coalitions are winning because they 
meet both the first threshold (majority of members) and the second one (majority of 
population). Other coalitions are not successful with regard to at least one of the two 
requirements (a majority of votes or of population as represented by the players), however. 
More specifically, coalition {A,B} meets the requirement with respect to the first quotum (as 
two out of three members are needed to support a proposal), but it fails to meet the second 
requirement.  
By comparison, the Treaty of Nice has stipulated a ‘triple majority clause’:
24 it required a 
qualified majority of voting weights and, generally, a simple majority of the EU states for 
decisions to pass. In addition to this, verification could be requested that the votes represent 
at least 62 percent of the EU population total. Effects of this rule have been analyzed 
extensively in Felsenthal and Machover (2001), for example, who demonstrate, inter alia, 
that the requirement regarding a majority of member states was superfluous, since there is 
no winning coalition that satisfies the first two requirements while not being composed of a 
majority of member states. 
                                                 
24   See Treaty of Nice (2001); Felsenthal and Machover (2001). 12 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
4. The Nice and Convention Proposals:  
A Comparison with EU Council Decision-Making  
in the Past and Present 
Evidently, QMV, as compared to the unanimity rule, tends to increase the Council’s ‘capacity 
to act’ – a point often emphasized by practitioners (e.g. Moberg, 2002). Using the method of 
assessment applied above, how ‘flexible’would decision-making in the Council be if either 
the provisions foreseen by the Treaty of Nice or the new suggestions contained in the draft 
constitution were to be implemented?  
In order to allow for a comparison over time, the distribution of votes among the EU states 
and the QMV threshold are shown in table 1 for the various stages in the EU’s history,
25 and 
include the Nice and draft constitution proposals. As can be seen, the Nice re-weighting of 
votes was the first instance of an increase in the voting weights of larger EU states since the 
re-weighting of votes that accompanied the 1973 enlargement. 
                                                 
25   See Hosli (1993), Paterson (1997), Felsenthal and Machover (1998; 2001). Note, however, that the use of 
QMV was limited in practice because of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’. This compromise was resorted to in 
the 1960s after the French ‘policy of the empty chair’. The compromise led to the requirement of unanimity 
whenever a member state’s ‘crucial national interests’ were considered to be at stake.  I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 13 
Table 1: The Distribution of Votes and the QMV Threshold in the Council of the EU 
Member States  1958– 
1972 
1973– 
1980 
1981– 
1985 
1986– 
1994 
Since  
1995  
Nice 
Treaty
1) 
(Triple 
Majority)  
Draft 
Consti-
tution 
(Double 
Majority) 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Poland 
Netherlands 
Greece 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Portugal 
Hungary 
Sweden 
Austria 
Slovakia 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Cyprus 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
  4 
  - 
  4 
  4 
  - 
  - 
  2 
  - 
  2 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  -- 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  1 
  - 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  - 
  -- 
  5 
  - 
  5 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  3 
  - 
  3 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  2 
  - 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  - 
  -- 
  5 
  5 
  5 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  3 
  - 
  3 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  2 
  - 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  8 
  5 
  5 
  5 
  5 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  3 
  - 
  3 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  2 
  - 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  10 
  8 
  - 
  5 
  5 
  5 
  - 
  5 
  - 
  4 
  4 
  - 
  3 
  3 
  3 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  2 
  - 
  29 
  29 
  29 
  29 
  27 
  27 
  13 
  12 
  12 
  12 
  12 
  12 
  10 
  10 
  7 
  7 
  7 
  7 
  7 
  4 
  4 
  4 
  4 
  4 
  3 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
  1 
QMV Threshold  
a)  voting 
weights 
b)  population 
 
c)  member  
states 
 
 
  12 
  -- 
 
 
  -- 
 
 
  41 
  -- 
 
 
  -- 
 
 
  45 
  -- 
 
 
  -- 
 
 
  54 
  -- 
 
 
  -- 
 
 
  62 
  -- 
 
 
  -- 
 
 
  232 
1)  
282.7 mio 
(62 %) 
 
  13 
 
 
  13  
 273.5 mio  
(60 %) 
 
  13  
Total 
a)  voting 
weights 
b)  population 
c)  member 
states 
 
 
  17 
  -- 
 
  -- 
 
 
  58 
  -- 
   
-- 
 
 
  63 
  -- 
   
-- 
 
 
  76 
  -- 
   
-- 
 
 
  87 
  -- 
   
-- 
 
 
  321 
455.9 mio 
 
  25 
 
 
  25 
 455.9 mio 
 
  25 
 
1)  Transitional arrangement envisaged for 1 May 2004 through 1 November 2004;  
see http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index_en.htm). 14 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
In a surprisingly regular pattern, moreover, the voting threshold for QMV, since the end of the 
1950’s, has stayed constant at about 71 percent of the weighted vote total.
26 By comparison, 
the convention proposal, would constitute a radical departure from the traditional pattern by 
allocating one vote to each member state. An additional population criterion (62 percent) was 
first introduced by the Treaty of Nice and modified (to 60 percent) in the Convention 
proposal.  
Applying the methodology described above, table 2 gives an overview of the proportion of 
winning coalitions in the Council that can form when coalition-formation is non-restricted, for 
each stage in the EU’s history. In addition, it shows the consequences of the provisions 
contained in the Nice Treaty and the draft constitution, respectively. To allow for comparison, 
table 2 also provides the respective number of possible winning coalitions under the 
unanimity requirement.  
                                                 
26   Hosli (1993). I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 15 
Table 2: The Capacity of the Council to Act under QMV and Unanimity (Coleman’s 
Measure of the Power of a Collectivity to Act) 
 
 
1958– 
1972 
1973– 
1980 
1981– 
1985 
1986– 
1994 
Since 
1995  
Nice 
(Triple 
Majority)  
Draft 
Constitution 
(Double 
Majority)  
Number of 
member states 
6  9  10  12  15  25  25 
Number of 
possible 
coalitions 
(combinations) 
among member 
states 
 
2
6 
 
2
9 
 
2
10 
 
2
12 
 
2
15 
 
2
25 
 
2
25 
QMV 
Number of 
possible winning 
coalitions 
 
14 
 
75 
 
140 
 
402 
 
2’549 
 
1’203’784 
 
7’548’821 
“Decision 
probability”: 
share of winning 
coalitions in total 
(in percent) 
 
21.88 
 
14.65 
 
13.67 
 
9.81 
 
7.78 
 
3.59 
 
 
22.50  
 
Betting odds 
against passing 
 
3.57:1 
 
5.83:1 
 
6.32:1 
 
9.19:1 
 
11.85:1 
 
26.86:1 
 
3.44:1 
Unanimity 
Number of 
winning 
coalitions 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
“Decision 
probability”: 
share of winning 
coalitions in total 
(in percent) 
 
1.5625 
 
0.1953 
 
0.0977 
 
0.0244 
 
 
0.0031 
 
 
0.00000298 
 
0.00000298 
Betting odds 
against passing 
 
63:1 
 
511:1 
 
1’024:1 
 
4’097:1 
 
32’257:1 
 
33’557’046:1 
 
33’557’046:1 
 
Increased membership, as table 2 illustrates, appears to have considerably reduced the 
Council’s capacity to act under the unanimity requirement – as it applied with respect to 
decisions taken either on the b asis of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’ or decisions formally 16 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
requiring unanimity (such as taxation). Under the unanimity rule, one in 64 coalitions (1.56 
percent) is winning in the framework of a six-member committee, whereas this proportion 
decreases to one  in 32’768 (or 0.0031  percent) in an institution encompassing fifteen 
members, implying a significant change in the ‘betting odds against passing’
27 from 63:1 to 
32’257: 1. With twenty-five members, decision probability decreases to one in 2
25, implying 
that obviously, the betting odds against passing are considerable indeed. 
These figures appear to be rather abstract. However, intuitively, it appears to be plausible 
that it is easier to reach agreement among three players than among ten, for example, 
although situations can of course be imagined in which the reverse holds true (depending on 
the specific distribution of players’ preferences). In this sense, the above figures provide 
simple ‘averages’, indicating the  a priori chances of forming various winning  coalitions, 
based on the decision weights and thresholds, ignoring any other information (such as 
specific preference constellations). They give simple trend lines regarding the extent to 
which decision-making may become more tedious with enlargement. 
How has decision probability changed in the framework of QMV over time? Since the QMV 
threshold remained at about 71 percent with each enlargement, one would expect that 
‘decision probability’ – measured as the share of winning coalitions in all possible coalitions 
among members – would have remained largely constant over time (a piece making this 
claim is Moberg, 2002). However, this intuition is misleading, as table 2 illustrates. The 
overview shows that a decrease in the Council’s capacity to act under QMV s hould be 
expected to have occurred between 1958 and the present, as the share of winning coalitions 
in the total that could be formed among member states was more than one in five (21.9 
percent) in the first phase of the Community’s existence, 14.7 percent after the 1973 
enlargement and lower ever since: between 1981 and 1985, the share was 13.7 percent, 
with a subsequent drop to 9.8 percent (1986–94). In the current constellation of EU 
membership, the ratio of winning coalitions to all coalitions that can  be formed under QMV 
among the 15 member states is 7.8 percent. Accordingly, the betting odds against passing 
within the EU Council have dropped from about 3.57:1 to 11.85:1 between 1958 and the 
present. The change, as compared to unanimity, is less dramatic, but significant 
nonetheless. 
Of course, decision-making could still be swift if enlargement is paralleled by a convergence 
of preferences, thus maintaining the ability of the Council to act. This claim would be in 
agreement with Golub’s empirical analysis (Golub, 1999; 2002). Accordingly, when members’ 
preferences are relatively close to each other, it may be possible that it is rather easier to 
agree, even when the group size expands.  
                                                 
27   This measure is adopted from Hosli and Machover (2004). I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 17 
Under the provisions of the Nice treaty and with 25 members, the Council’s decision 
probability under QMV would decrease to 3.6 percent. By comparison, under the provisions 
foreseen by the draft constitution, it would remain remarkably flexible at 22.5 percent,
28 
reaching a decision probability that is even slightly higher  than that attained in the 1958–
1973 phase.  
Certainly, resorting to more QMV decisions in the framework of the 1987 Single European 
Act (SEA) may have facilitated EU decision-making. However, analyzed with the tools 
described above, this change may have been counterbalanced to a certain extent by the loss 
in flexibility induced by increased EU membership. In this sense, moving from unanimity to 
QMV is not the only remedy against low decision capacity: the decision threshold plays an 
imminently important role regarding the Council’s ‘capacity to act’ (Leech, 2002; Hosli and 
Machover, 2004). 
Effects on decision probability are not the only consequences of the recent suggestions for 
voting weight adaptations, however. Clearly, distributional effects also materialize. Much of 
the recent discussion has focused on the effects that the provisions of the Treaty of Nice and 
those of the draft constitution would generate regarding the balance of influence among EU 
states in the Council of the EU. Since these respective calculations use similar tools to those 
applied above, table 3 applies two prominent power indices in order to indicate the current 
distribution of a priori influence among EU states in the Council and the effects generated by 
the Nice and Convention proposals on this distribution.
29 
                                                 
28   Another method has recently been applied for measuring decision probability, based on the Shapley-Shubik 
approach. This approach finds a more moderate decrease in the Council’s capacity to act according to the 
Nice provisions, but similarly, a lower figure for decision efficiency in the Council under the Convention 
proposal (oral communication with Iain Paterson, December 2003).  
29   For helpful information on the characteristics of various power indices, e.g. see Pajala et al. (2002).  18 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
Table 3: Relative Voting Power of EU States in the Council: The Nice and Convention 
Proposals (Normalized Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik Index) 
Member 
State 
Population 
2003 
(in million) 
 
15 EU States (Since 
1995) 
 
Nice (25 Members) 
 
 
Convention (25 
Members) 
   
Normalized 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Shapley-
Shubik 
Index 
Normalized 
Banzhaf 
Index
1) 
Shapley-
Shubik 
Index
1) 
Normali-
zed 
Banzhaf 
Index
1) 
Shapley-
Shubik 
Index
1) 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Poland 
Netherlands 
Greece 
Belgium 
Czech 
Republic 
Portugal 
Hungary 
Sweden 
Austria 
Slovakia 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Cyprus 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
82.4 
60.2 
60.1 
58.0 
40.2 
38.6 
16.2 
10.7 
10.3 
 
10.2 
10.1 
10.0 
9.9 
8.2 
5.4 
5.4 
5.2 
3.9 
3.6 
2.3 
1.9 
1.4 
0.8 
0.5 
0.4 
11.16 
11.16 
11.16 
11.16 
9.24 
-- 
5.87 
5.87 
5.87 
 
-- 
5.87 
-- 
4.79 
4.79 
-- 
3.59 
3.59 
3.59 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2.26 
-- 
11.67 
11.67 
11.67 
11.67 
9.55 
-- 
5.52 
5.52 
5.52 
 
-- 
5.52 
-- 
4.54 
4.54 
-- 
3.53 
3.53 
3.53 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2.07 
-- 
8.56 
8.56 
8.56 
8.56 
8.12 
8.12 
4.23 
3.91 
3.91 
 
3.91 
3.91 
3.91 
3.27 
3.27 
2.31 
2.31 
2.31 
2.31 
2.31 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
0.99 
9.49 
9.37 
9.37 
9.37 
8.67 
8.67 
3.95 
3.61 
3.61 
 
3.61 
3.61 
3.61 
2.99 
2.99 
2.07 
2.07 
2.07 
2.07 
2.07 
1.17 
1.17 
1.17 
1.17 
1.17 
0.87 
13.25 
9.57 
9.56 
9.27 
6.87 
6.75 
3.63 
2.93 
2.88 
 
2.87 
2.86 
2.85 
2.83 
2.62 
2.26 
2.26 
2.24 
2.07 
2.04 
1.87 
1.82 
1.75 
1.68 
1.64 
1.63 
16.38 
11.33 
11.31 
10.88 
7.78 
7.53 
3.40 
2.52 
2.46 
 
2.44 
2.43 
2.41 
2.40 
2.14 
1.72 
1.72 
1.69 
1.50 
1.45 
1.25 
1.19 
1.11 
1.02 
0.98 
0.96 
Total  455.9  100.0  100.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
1) Results generated with König and Bräuninger (2001). I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 19 
Clearly, the suggestion of the draft convention is ‘radical’ in terms of its distributional 
consequences, allocating more a priori power to larger EU states.
30 Even though the Council 
proposal could have increased the decision probability within the Council, this ‘balancing’ 
may have been a major rationale for why the EU summit meeting in December 2003 on the 
draft constitution failed: the relative influence of member states in the Council, on the basis 
of the distribution of voting weights, is indeed central to states’ interests. 
Hence, the Convention succeeded in formulating provisions to enhance the capacity of the 
Council to act. With this, however, it lowered the ability of individual governments to block 
collective EU decisions and suggested a re-balancing of influence within the Council in favor 
of the larger EU states. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper shows that the choice of a decision rule for the Council of the EU constitutes a 
trade-off in terms of decreased sovereignty for individual governments versus an increased 
‘capacity to act’. This trade-off is well known from the various debates about moving from the 
unanimity rule to QMV in some important policy fields, including foreign and security policy, 
and taxation. 
The relevant decision rules will not only matter regarding ‘day-to-day’ decisions in the EU 
Council, however. Supporting general intuition, this paper provides background calculations 
which indicate that, with a significantly expanded membership, the EU will indeed risk being 
unable to reach intergovernmental agreement. Accordingly, a challenging issue for the EU is 
to move towards provisions allowing for its own constitution, once adopted, to be amended: 
again, the trade-off between state sovereignty and the EU’s capacity to act is at the core of 
this dilemma. 
In view of enlargement to 25 members in spring 2004, the EU risks paralysis of its own 
decision-making capacity. The European Convention has come up with an ingenious design 
that would, as this paper demonstrates, indeed enhance the capacity of the EU Council to 
act. However, this change would also strongly increase the relative influence of larger states 
in EU decision-making. Accordingly, it would lower the protection of the interests of smaller 
and medium-sized EU states. By contrast, the provisions foreseen in the Treaty of Nice, 
which essentially amount to the implementation of a ‘triple-majority rule’ in Council decision-
                                                 
30   In interpreting the results of table 3, it has to be kept in mind that each enlargement usually generates a 
relative decrease in the power of current EU states. In this sense, an increase in the relative power of 
Germany from currently 11.16 percent to 13.25 percent (Banzhaf index) and from 11.67 percent to 16.38 
percent (Shapley-Shubik index) is considerable indeed. 20 — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — I H S 
 
making, would lead to a more moderate ‘re-balancing’ in favor of larger EU states, but would 
lower the Council’s capacity to act.  
Such findings are not necessarily intuitively plausible. Background calculations are needed in 
order to discern the effects not only of different vote allocation schemes, but also of various 
other elements needed to form winning coalitions in the Council (such as the number of EU 
states, the required population threshold and a qualified majority of voting weights). The 
findings of this paper have profited from the fact that programs readily available on the 
internet, especially ‘Indices of Power’ (König and Bräuninger, 2001) and ‘Powerslave’ (Pajala 
et al., 2002), make calculations, even for twenty-five member states, relatively simple 
exercises to undertake. The results presented in this paper corroborate similar findings 
presented elsewhere (e.g. Federer et al., 2003; Felsenthal and Machover, 2003). In spite of 
a number of critiques that have been made against techniques which analyze voting power 
and decision probability (e.g. Albert, 2003), such techniques may indeed still be useful (e.g. 
Baldwin et al., 2001; Felsenthal et al., 2003) in assessing the central institutional challenges 
facing the EU in view of the forthcoming enlargement. 
Reflecting on the results presented in this paper, it is far from astonishing that 
intergovernmental agreement on the EU draft constitutional treaty may largely have failed 
due to the salient issue of the relative influence of EU states in EU Council decision-making. 
Not only would the proposals of the draft constitution have increased the Council’s capacity 
to act, leading to respective decreases in governments’ blocking power, but it would also 
have significantly enhanced the influence of larger states in EU decision-making. In this 
sense, it would have considerably increased constitutional flexibility regarding EU day-to-day 
decision-making, but without adequately protecting the interests of the citizens of smaller 
and medium-sized EU states. In spite of its considerable achievements, including an 
increased capacity of the Council to act, the draft constitution may have paid too little 
attention to the ‘legitimacy’ concerns of smaller entities. In addition, the draft constitution was 
not successful in establishing new procedures for the EU’s capacity to adapt its ‘rules on 
rules’ – thereby deteriorating the EU’s overall flexibility of constitutional design. I H S — Madeleine O. Hosli / The Flexibility of Constitutional Design — 21 
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